Sweaty palms, pale cheeks

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Dear Reader,

You know those anxiety dreams where you are standing in front of a large crowd and it dawns on you that you have had no time to prepare, and you have no idea what you are going to say?

I’m always reminded of them when I watch Economy Minister Robert Habeck delivering his annual report on the state of the German economy.

Every January, the normally eloquent Habeck's face drains of blood as he tries to wrap his tongue around the technical jargon of his ministry in the vain hope that doing so will distract his audience from the miserable figures he has to present.

For thirty minutes, he prevaricates and obfuscates, or points at a graph that shows why the economic weather is actually far better than the headlines would have you believe.

Back in January 2023, he managed to eat up the first five minutes of his presentation by philosophising on the ins and outs of supplying weapons to Ukraine. Once he'd sensed that the first eyelids had begun to droop, he dropped the bombshell that the economy had slipped into a recession.

This was actually a good thing though, he explained, as some unnamed economists had predicted that GDP would contract by 12 percent due to the gas crisis - but he'd managed to ensure that we would only just dip into a recession, if at all.

He pointed to a graph optimistically titled “Economic prospects better than expected,” which showed a little bump in the road before the economy would kick off into the future.

Twelve months later, things still hadn't improved.

Again, the visual props came out. These graphs, conveniently plotting different values to 12 months previously, were “really interesting” he waffled, and indicated that an improvement in the country’s fortunes was imminent.

Yes, the economy was set to flatline for another year. But this time it was China's fault. They had lost interest in German goods. “There’s nothing we can do to lift up the Chinese economy,” Habeck sighed.

Still, there was plenty to be positive about. “Clear signs” of an improvement included “spectacular examples of companies investing billions of euros in new factories... simply because we are a strong business location.”

This Wednesday, with three weeks to go until the election, Habeck got the chance to deliver his final economic report. And he seemed completely drained of any optimism. "Germany is trapped in stagnation," he said, tiredly.

There was no mention of how the “spectacular” business investments were developing. Which is hardly surprising: battery maker Northvolt (€600 million subsidy) has filed for bankruptcy, Intel (awarded €10 billion subsidy) has put its plans to build a factory in Magdeburg on ice, ThyssenKrupp (€1.3 billion subsidy) posted losses of over a billion euros last year.

Instead, Habeck had to announce that his ministry had slashed its growth forecast for 2025 from 1.1 percent to just 0.3 percent.

Those numbers put Germany on the brink of a third year of recession. That is bad enough in itself - Germany's economy has never shrunk for three consecutive years.

However, the reality is even worse. The economy hasn’t grown meaningfully since 2018. The only thing that masks this unparalleled period of stagnation in the official statistics is the rebound in 2022 after the Covid lockdowns.

Flapping around for an explanation, Habeck blamed the collapse of the government (he had “always warned” that a snap election would cause companies to hold back on investments) and Trump’s tariff threats, which he then admitted weren’t actually calculated into the forecast!

Indeed, even Habeck knew that a "dog ate my homework" excuse wasn't going to do the trick this time. So he tacked in the other direction and said that the lack of growth was in fact structural - and was the result of decades of underinvestment in public infrastructure.

In other words: it still wasn't his fault.

“It could be that we weren’t looking closely enough in the past, meaning that we saw signs of recovery after crises and thought ‘it’ll surely carry on like that,’" he said as an excuse for his upbeat presentations in previous years.

“But the numbers are clear - we're stagnating and we’ve been stagnating for a long time.”

Well hallelujah - you’ve recognise the problem three weeks before you leave office!

Those words provide an interesting insight on the inner workings of the Economy Minister's brain. Presented with a line that fluctuates around a constant value, he sees only the upward trajectory.

For Habeck, this is a good quality. On his campaign posters, he calls it ‘Zuversicht’ (confidence).

For the rest of us, it's called failing your GCSE maths.

All in all, Habeck's presentation on Wednesday should have put the final nail into the coffin of the Ampelregierung. But, in the words of a former Westminster spin doctor, it was a good day to bury bad news.

Only a couple of hours later, one of the heftiest debates in the history of the Bundestag took place, meaning the economy was banished to the back pages.

Up for discussion was a resolution by the CDU that asked the parties to vote on a 5-point plan for ending illegal immigration.

Controversially, the resolution called for everyone to be turned back at the border who doesn’t have valid entry papers. If implemented, it would mean a de facto end (or at least freeze) on all irregular migration.

The rump of Olaf Scholz’ coalition (The SPD and the Greens) couldn’t possibly support the resolution. For one, doing so would be an admission that they hadn’t done everything in their power to prevent illegal migration while in office. They also insist that the CDU plan would constitute an unforgivable affront to EU neighbours (almost none of whom abide by the bloc's migration rules).

That left the CDU with an uncomfortable choice: rely on votes from the hard-right AfD or look weak and not put the plan to a vote.

Awkwardly, the CDU had vowed in no uncertain terms just two months previously that they would never pass a law by relying on votes from the AfD.

Nonetheless, with migration now the key theme in the election, they decided to put the resolution to a vote regardless.

Which meant that Wednesday's debate ended up being about much more than the substance of the resolution - it turned into a debate on the very rules of German democracy in the year 2024.

This is an extremely serious (and complex) subject!

What the CDU, SPD and Greens can all agree upon is that there is a concept called "the democratic middle” and laws should only be passed by parties that exist inside this centre ground.

“The democratic middle” shouldn't be confused with the Bundestag itself. In 2024, the parliament only superficially represents the democratic will of the people. Within it there is a democratic core and something else (we're never exactly sure what).

Suffice to say, there is broad-based agreement that this democratic middle exists in some real sense and is not just a logical tautology postulated by politicians who stand to gain from its existence. Public broadcasters have attempted to define it, while economists have worked on papers on how to strengthen it.

Central to Wednesday’s debate was whether a law has to be agreed upon by all parties of the democratic middle before being put to a debate in the public chamber.

The Greens and SPD insisted that, yes, all bills and resolutions should be signed off by the democratic middle first. Laws that aren’t signed off in this way before going to a public vote risk losing the legitimacy of being from the middle, democratic or both.

Parties from the middle that propose such laws also risk leaving the middle with them. “Friedrich Merz has removed the CDU from the democratic middle,” several SPD bigwigs thundered in indignation afterwards.

However, the CDU insist that belonging to the democratic middle implies voting for laws that strengthen the aforementioned middle, whether you agree with the substance of them or not.

I listened to the debate intently. But I struggled to understand the concept in its entirety.

Of the two parts of this duality, which is superior? By extension, is there an undemocratic middle, and a democratic periphery?

Is the democratic middle a perfect circle, or is it oblique (thus explaining why the SPD and Greens are able to form state governments with Die Linke without leaving the middle)?

And, once a party has left the democratic middle, is there a chance of salvation?

On Wednesday, the CDU resolution eventually passed thanks to votes from the FDP (firmly in the middle), AfD (definitely not in the middle). The left-wing Bündnis Sahra Wagenknecht (of questionable middleness!) are set to support a draft law on migration on Friday.

Does that mean that the votes are undemocratic (which would surely make it a case for the courts?) - or simply not middle-ish enough?

I confess, I'm not sure. What I really need is someone to plot this new political schema on a chart for me.

Mr Habeck, any help?

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