Merz’s realpolitik approach to Iran and what it means for Germany
Merz says a "rules-based international" order should apply...but not when it comes to toppling some authoritarian regimes.
Dear Reader,
In the hours before the joint American-Israeli strikes on Iran early Saturday morning, only one European country was informed in advance: Germany.
Notably, Chancellor Friedrich Merz (CDU) has also been the only European leader to meet Donald Trump since the targeted blows on Tehran — attacks that have since escalated into a broader Middle Eastern conflict.
One might think this access gave Merz a golden opportunity to pursue the trajectory he outlined at the Munich Security Conference last month: that Germany needs to work to defend the rules-based order. “We Germans know that a world in which only power counts would be a dark place,” he said in Munich, adding that international law “protects our sovereignty and our freedom.”
Yet, since the war on Iran started he has avoided criticism of Washington. Indeed, he has explicitly condoned the attack, despite the fact that they happened without UN approval.
“Now is not the moment to lecture partners and allies,” he said, noting that decades of German and European condemnations of Iran’s violations of international law — alongside extensive sanctions — have achieved little.
Merz is not known to mince his words — the term “Merzsplaining” has even entered popular parlance — but the trained lawyer is strategic. He was willing to speak out against rule-breaking when Trump threatened to invade Greenland, a sovereign territory of NATO ally Denmark, yet switched his tone when the US acted unilaterally against a regime that has long posed a security concern for Europe and murdered its own people for peacefully protesting.
“There is no ideal time to undertake such action, but there may be a time when it is too late,” Merz continued, a possible sign of relief that another powerful leader had stepped up to the plate.
Reaction within Germany has been sharply divided. The conservative tabloid Bild praised Merz for demonstrating a “clear moral compass,” while the left-leaning taz accused him of embracing a “Schrödinger’s international law” — a doctrine that applies legal principles selectively, when convenient. In its view, Germany was downgrading international law to something merely “nice to have.”
Shortly before Merz met Trump in Washington, the centre-left SPD parliamentary group sharply criticised the US and Israeli strikes on Iran as a breach of international law, saying diplomacy had not yet been exhausted.
But Jens Spahn, leader of the CDU/CSU parliamentary group, voiced a view on par with Merz’: “The question is whether international law can ultimately be on the side of a terrorist regime,” he said.
Advertisement
To find out more about ottonova’s private health insurance policies click here.
A pragmatic turn
Merz became even more supportive during his meeting with Trump in Washington on Tuesday morning. He had just stayed overnight at the Blair House, the president’s posh official guest residence — a symbolic gesture of closeness. After thanking Trump for his hospitality, Merz praised the US’ efforts against Iran. “We are on the same side and want this terrible, terrorist regime to fall,” he said.
Yet moments later, he pivoted. “The war in Ukraine must end. And Ukraine must be able to retain its territory,” Merz told Trump, who smiled, then quickly changed the subject. The exchange captured the chancellor’s pragmatic approach: laying praise on the president where necessary in the hope of extracting concessions where they matter most to Europe.
That constraint was made painfully clear on Ukraine, where German interests are far more explicit. Merz can press for a peaceful resolution or for Kyiv to retain its territory, but he has little leverage over Trump’s priorities.
Despite affirmations of support, the US president offered vague commitments at best, quickly moving on to other topics — including, as he frequently does, his claimed record of ending eight unspecified wars. For all Germany’s financial, military, and diplomatic investment in Ukraine, its influence over outcomes remains limited.
The meeting also highlighted Germany’s familiar role: closely coordinated with Washington, yet constrained by limited leverage. That imbalance has been years in the making. When the Iran nuclear agreement was concluded in 2015, Germany played a key role alongside the permanent members of the UN Security Council — France, the UK, the US, China, and Russia — in what became known as the E3+3. The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action was hailed as a triumph of diplomacy. Three years later, it was effectively killed by the US withdrawal under Trump, and all European efforts to salvage it failed.
Today, Germany, France, and the UK are once again coordinating, pledging to take “necessary measures… to defend our interests and those of our allies in the region” — language that includes the possibility of “proportionate military defensive measures” to neutralise Iran’s missile and drone capabilities. What this means in practice varies sharply by country. For the Bundesrepublik, it means nothing more than Bundeswehr units defending themselves if attacked, German Foreign Minister Johann Wadephul said on Monday.
Concrete consequences for Germany
Germany may have been informed in advance of the strikes on Iran, but it is now experiencing the conflict much like everyone else: through its consequences. Domestic security services have been placed on heightened alert, particularly around Jewish, Israeli, and US-linked sites. In the Middle East, small German military contingents have come under fire — a reminder that regional escalation quickly touches European forces.
So far, Berlin has drawn a clear line. Germany has not moved toward the “proportionate military defensive measures” mentioned in the joint E3 statement. Instead, the government has focused on containment and crisis management: charter flights to Saudi Arabia and Oman to evacuate stranded citizens, intensified diplomatic coordination, and defensive precautions rather than operational commitments.
This posture reflects Merz’s assessment of what advance notice and close access actually allow. He has strengthened coordination with Israel, the US, and European partners but has avoided any suggestion that Germany could — or should — shape the conflict militarily. In his calculus, external strikes might buy time, but they cannot engineer political change. The legacies of Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya serve as cautionary examples.
Still, distance doesn’t offer complete protection. Even without direct participation, Germany will absorb the fallout: heightened security risks at home, pressure on energy markets, disrupted trade routes, potential refugee movements, and renewed diplomatic strain. The conflict is already testing Europe’s resilience, regardless of how carefully it calibrates its involvement.
Germany may have been informed, consulted, and received — even granted VIP access to the White House — but none of this has translated into decisive influence, in Iran or Ukraine. Merz’s handling of the Iran strikes reveals the limits of Berlin’s power in a fractured international order: close enough to be consulted, too weak to shape events. His careful balancing act — praise where necessary, restraint where prudent — reflects a broader reality. Germany can coordinate, protect its interests, and respond to developments. But it cannot dictate the course of events.
News in Brief
An administrative court has forbidden Germany’s domestic intelligence agency from describing the AfD as a “verified right-wing extremist” organisation. Last year, the BfV intelligence agency produced a 1,000-page document — filled with quotes from AfD politicians — which it used as evidence to classify the populist party as such. The court, however, found that the BfV had not sufficiently demonstrated that the party as a whole is extremist. The decision is a major victory for the AfD and makes attempts by political opponents to ban the party for its alleged opposition to the constitution seem much less plausible.
The first state election since last February’s national ballot is taking place in Baden-Württemberg on Sunday, with the CDU neck and neck with the Greens in the polls. The state capital, Stuttgart, is home to Daimler, Bosch and Porsche. With those carmakers in deep trouble, some speculate that Stuttgart is facing a similar future to Detroit. But deindustrialisation has not been at the top of the campaign. Instead, the CDU candidate, a 38-year-old novice, has been tripped up by an old TV interview in which he made sexualised comments about an underage girl.
Germany’s neglected Deutsche Bahn rail network has frequently frustrated travellers, with delays and full cancellations commonplace. Lately, more funds have been funnelled into its repair and reconstruction, but the new DB boss, Evelyn Palla, predicted this week that it will still take around 10 years before the entire nationwide network is reliable again. To accelerate progress, many busy lines will be completely closed for months at a time, a strategy which Palla described as “unavoidable” after years of underinvestment. By 2036, the state-owned DB wants to renovate more than 40 heavily used routes as part of a plan to gradually upgrade the entire network.